Critique is a driving force not only for the development of political ideas and concepts, but also for protecting humane and democratic politics against the perils of epistemic and political ideologies. Yet, while there is much debate about the question of 'What is critique?', the conditions of critique appear largely under-reflected in International Politics and the Social Sciences more generally. This paper goes beyond the question of what critique in politics and social science might consist of and holds that critique is not an end in itself, but rather requires a yardstick to discuss and judge its generative conditions, i.e., its foundation, legitimization, and direction that it must pertain to be meaningful. The following paper will explore the oeuvres of 20 th -century political and social theorists Hans J. Morgenthau, Herbert Marcuse, and Eric Voegelin and argues that the three principles of perspectivity', negation', and 'noesis' that can be concluded from their work provide such generative conditions of critique, practically leading to a novel policy framework of the nonirreversibility of politics.
Introduction
Critique seems to assume that we are in a better or superior position than the author, text, or politician that is criticized; but what justifies this assumption? In researching this question, this paper attempts to go beyond the question of 'What is critique? ', 1 but asks what enables and legitimizes the social scientist, the philosopher, the politician, finally every one of us, to be critical.
While Herbert Marcuse's, Hans J Morgenthau's, and Eric Voegelin's work is each deficient in explicating their conditions of critique, together and combined they promise to hold important insights to elaborate conditions of critique and of humane politics.
Even though the work of Morgenthau, Marcuse, and Voegelin does not explicitly reflect upon the conditions of (their) critique, their oeuvres nevertheless hold crucial insights for the formulation His contemporary Morgenthau was certainly not shy of critiquing politicians and colleagues, in publications, speeches, and political action. Indeed, he was very much an alerting voice and public intellectual against, academically, positivist science, a-historical inquiry, and dehumanizing tendencies of a priori-rationalizations in the social sciences; and, politically, of modern ideologies of social planning, consumer society, and national power politics. 3 We find in Morgenthau's writings, however, even less reflection on the conditions that enabled his critique than in Marcuse.
However, when taking into account, too, his unpublished work, we can elaborate the notion of the contingency of political knowledge and practice as, too, the conditions of his own arguments.
And Voegelin, probably the least known to students of International Politics, is often associated with conservative scholarship, shares, however, many critiques with Critical Theory and Classical Realism as of modern reason, of the idea of an autonomous individual, and of nationalism and political ideologies (even if all three arrived at different answers) 4 . But it also needs to be asked here: what enables his critique? And what thoughts can we find in his work with regard to the question of conditions of critique? His specific contribution -which comes to full fruition under the present inquiry when linked and combined with the notions of perspectivity (à la Morgenthau) and 3 dialectic negation of knowledge (à la Marcuse) -lies in the embedding of 'negative', deconstructing knowledge by means of perspectivity and negation into a 'positive' re-articulation of humanity and political order through the notion of 'noesis'.
More specifically, Morgenthau's idea of the temporal and spatial contingency and perspectivity of knowledge (a concept that he develops in reference to Karl Mannheim's concept of "Standortgebundenheit"), combined with the notion of a dialectical negation of arguments as discussed by Marcuse (as 'thesis' and 'anti-thesis') , need to be framed and embedded within the concept of 'noesis' (i.e., apperceiving self-reflectivity) as interpreted by Voegelin. The triangulation of perspectivity and dialectical negation with political 'noesis' provides a catalogue of principles that prevent epistemic and political ideologies and safeguard humane and pluralistic politics. 5 This triad translates into four practical propositions for research and politics that found a new normative approach to a politics of non-irreversibility alluded to in the Conclusions.
The argument
This paper develops the following argument: while there are two epistemological requirements that enable critique -the idea of the conditionality and space-time-contingency of political knowledge and the idea of negation -there seems to be the necessity to complement both with the notion of 'noesis', i.e., the apperceiving reflectivity of critique on its own structures, reason, and experience.
While "Standortgebundenheit" and negation rest on temporal ontology, suggesting the 'transformativity', rather than identity of social relations and political order, 6 In sum, the triangulation of 'noesis', dialectic negation, and "Standortgebundenheit" are much more than normative thinking about politics: they not only provide theoretical principles, but offer indispensable tools for the critique of political claims and practices when and as soon as they violate and harm humane and democratic (i.e., as will be argued in the Conclusions, reversible) politics.
Thus, they deliver necessary critical standards of humanity vis-à-vis political theory and political practices, finally, too, for our own arguments and practices.
Structure of the Paper
These expositions result in the following structure of paper: in a first step, I will discuss the idea of the conditionality and space-time-contingency of knowledge and political theory in Morgenthau. In a second step, I will then elaborate on the idea of dialectical negation in Marcuse. In a third step, I
will elaborate Voegelin's notion of 'noesis'. In a fourth section, I will bring these discussions together in the light of the main question of conditions of critique and conclude the following four practical consequences for research and politics:
(1) Research concepts and practices need to be framed in relation to the historical and cultural circumstances of the researcher and the "object"-under-study, while there is no independent, 'objective' vantage point for the development and application of concepts and research strategies.
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(2) Every research process and research finding needs to incorporate the possibility of alternative views and suggest its own refutability. Accordingly, it has to imply in such cases a discreet and diplomatic option for the normative and political practice that might result from itself.
(3) Research in international politics and the social sciences more generally has to resonate with human experience, the apperception of humanity, and 'the person', 7 rather than with policies of progress, performance measurement, social engineering, and institutional design as if these were ends in themselves.
(4) With regard to practical politics, the claim arises of the non-irreversibility of political practice, i.e., politics shall not result in consequences that are irreparable and unalterable. This aspect will be elaborated as an instrument to assess and evaluate concrete policies, connecting to, and the same time providing innovative ground for, contemporary theoretical and policy debates such as on energy, environmental, and security issues.
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On the perspectivity of knowledge and political theory We thus recognize his critical disassociation from three prominent theories of knowledge:
First, he is critical about a rationalist approach to overcome the confinements of human knowledge through the construction of knowledge of the external world out of indubitable principles possessed 7 inherently by the mind itself, the most indubitable of such principles being Descartes's 'Cogito ergo sum'. This kind of rationalist knowledge would be invulnerable to any kind of scepticism and is supposed to represent the basis of all further knowledge about the world. 11 We recognize here the belief that the existence of objects outside the self can be based on and deduced from the mind's awareness of its own existence, thereby allowing to dispel all doubts and insecurities about knowledge and accomplishing epistemological security regarding the existence, constitution, and character of the world (also called 'dualism'; see Holt et al., 1960: 154) . Morgenthau promotes a position that is critical about this epistemological paradigm, especially with regard to its a priori, experience-independent claims and assumptions about the world (see Behr, 2013) . Political realism in Morgenthau is hence an anti-Cartesian position which recognizes the mind-independent existence of an empirical world and human agency within this world, but which does not, however, claim secure and definite knowability of, and analytical accessibility to, this world. His realism is aware that there exist factualities about the world and its penetrating principles that are mind-independent, but that those 'facts' and principles, however, adopt different empirical meanings throughout history and cultures; they are conditioned and shaped by time and space-contingent constellations created through human mind, perception, imagination, and agency. 12 This epistemological position recognizes perennial forces which penetrate political reality, but requires for their understanding contextspecific explanations and hermeneutic methods; in short, it is "Erfahrungswissenschaft" that proclaims universal epistemological positions while at the same time demanding temporally and spatially sensitive explanations of particular manifestations of those perennial forces.
Second, Morgenthau is also adverse to an empiricism which would base knowledge about the political world on merely sensually conceived impressions and which would rely in its assertions about the world on (ostensibly) mind-independent data bruta, i.e. methodologically on positivist quantifications and measurements of social and political phenomena, built on the hope that through inductive logic there may be some day some kind of spill-over from data collection to knowledge (see also the discussions in Holt et al. 1960: 152) .
And third, Morgenthau's epistemology, because it recognizes the mind-independent, however spatio-temporally qualified status of things real, 'strips mind of its pretensions, but not of its value or greatness (…) Realism dethrones the mind, [and at the same time] recognizes mind as chief in the world' (Alexander 1960: 186) . We here further recognize an anti-idealist position against the belief in a 'world in which there exist only minds ' (Holt et al. 1960: 154, 155) . Politically speaking, and in sharp contrast to Morgenthau's position, idealism would presume the fabricability and shapability of the world without, as he argues, taking into account to a sufficiently high degree the concepts of power, interest, and morality and the 'factual', but empirically divergent constellations, which these concepts make cognizable. He notes:
For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts (…) Yet examination of the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy [here, we recognize Friedrich Nietzsche's "facts are stupid" 13 ], we must approach political reality with a kind of rationale outline, a map that suggests to us (…) possible meanings of foreign policy (from the First of his 'Six Principles …').
This 'map' 14 for the rational (and very purposefully Morgenthau does not write rationalist) conceptualization of reality is provided by the concepts of power, interest, and morality and their interplay.
These concepts, which condensate in his mantra 'interest defined in terms of power' (from the Second of his 'Six Principles …'), are such a rational conceptualization. They do not express an ontological statement of how the world 'is', even if they became read, or better misread as such by International Relations mainstream time and again. In Morgenthau's words they can rather be understood as a 'signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics' (ibid.). Here it becomes clear that this sentence articulates epistemological categories which 'provide the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood' (ibid). And this is precisely not a subordination of political reality under either rationalist, empiricist, or idealist principles Another quote in this context is further instructive for the epis-9 temological character of the concepts of power and interest: 'The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer' (emphasis by the authors; from the Second of his 'Six Principles …').
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In order to further understand epistemology in Morgenthau -and 'realism' is to be understood as epistemology, 16 not as an ontology of international politics as often misread -we need to emphasize his statements that empiricist and positivist accounts would indeed 'become a pretentious collection of trivialities ' (1962a: 27) . He insists that empirics has to be given social and political meaning (from his First of his 'Six Principles …') and that, as he notes elsewhere and much earlier (in 195l; here 1962a) , 'the empiricist commitment of modern political science to practical ends [i.e. as a 'problem-solving' empiricist science] (…) has powerfully contributed to its decline as theory ' (25) .
This criticism resonates with his argumentation against analogies between natural and social sciences and humanities, arguing that '(to) make susceptibility to quantitative measurement the yardstick of the scientific character of the social sciences (…) is to deprive these sciences of that very orientation which is adequate to the understanding of their subject matter ' (1962a: 27 While it is unnecessary to argue the case for the need for factual information, it ought to be no more necessary to argue that factual description is not science, but a mere (…) preparation for the scientific understanding of the facts (1962a: 26).
Therefore, realist epistemology consists in the acknowledgment of the existence of mindindependent political realities in which, however, the mind plays a paramount role in that these mind-independent realities become meaningful only through theoretical understanding. Further to this, these 'facts' are not to be seen as eternally the same, but have to be recognized in their spatio-temporal constellations. This fundamental position of realist epistemology posits that both the Through [critical theory], given facts are understood as appearances whose essence can be comprehended only in the context of particular historical tendencies aiming at a different form of reality. The theory's historical interest enter constitutively into its conceptual scheme and makes the transcendence of 'facts' towards their essence critical and polemic ' (1968: 71) .
This takes us to the core of critical theory and its notion of dialectic negation. To find out those historical alternatives and possibilities of its realization, including reasons for why other pathways of historical development have dominated, is linked to the ideas of emancipation and liberation. The 11 awareness and elaboration of historical alternatives and potentialities underlines man's potential role as creator of his social, political, and economic conditions. Here, Marcuse, at least, speaks to us as if he were driven by the idea to rescue some of the Enlightenment promises which have been so pessimistically dismantled by his peers Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer.
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The search for historical alternatives within critical theory and Marcuse is guided by the idea that there actually is and would have been an alternative to every actual event, thus for every event there is a potentiality of being-otherwise. This road to permanent and always possible negation and alternatives takes us to the notion of 'dialectic' that is so paradigmatic for critical theory. 23 Marcuse writes:
Materialist theory thus transcends the given state of fact and moves towards a different potentiality, proceeding from immediate appearance to the essence that appears in it. But here appearance and essence become members of a real antithesis arising from the particular historical structure of the social process of life. The essence of man and of things appears within that structure; what men and things could genuinely be appears in "bad", "perverted" form. At the same time, however, appears the possibility of negating this perversion and realizing in history that which could be. This antagonistic character of the historical process as it is today turns the opposition of essence and appearance into a dialectical relationship and this relationship into an object of the dialectic.
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As we can see here, the idea of dialectic and negation does not only relate to materialistic, historical events, thus to 'historical materialism', but also to the awareness and consciousness of the theoretician. The theoretician not only studies historical 'realities' and 'potentialities', but needs to be aware of, and to build-in his/her analysis, a dialectic of the argument. The relation between 'thesis' and 'anti-thesis' and their permanent forward-drive is of both materialistic and intellectual character. This means for the critical theorist that he/she needs to always be aware of the potential and actual negation of the own argument and should even push and develop the own argument towards its own negation. In 'Traditional and critical theory', Horkheimer briefly reflects upon the role of the critical theorist and it is interesting to see how he sees this role; he writes: This envisioning seems only possible through a dialectic forward-development of the own theoretical argument and analysis that negates itself as soon as it is made. An indeed this seems to be the idea when he writes: 'Reality is overcome by being comprehended as the mere possibility of another reality ' (1968: 83) . Although I do not want to elaborate on inner contradictions of Marcuse's arguments, there is one aspect that nevertheless needs to be mentioned as it appears very important to Marcuse and critical theory more generally. In Negations he writes with regard to the theory-practice relation of critical theory:
What, however, if the development outlined by the theory does not occur? What if the forces that were to bring about the transformation are suppressed and appear to be defeated? Little as the theory's truth is thereby contradicted, it nevertheless appears then in a new light which illuminates new aspects and elements of its object ' (1968: 142) Irrespective of this absurdity, we can record that the notion of dialectic negation provokes the theoretician, finally everyone, to be aware of the permanent negation and counter-possibility of 13 one's own argument, historically and theoretically. This notion therefore includes the necessity of permanent self-criticality (as either a concurrent aspect within or procedural aspect subsequent to one's own argument and action). This resembles Jacques Derrida's notion of erasure and translates in the proposition of self-refutability.
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The notion of 'noesis'
The third notion that shall be developed here as a principle of conditions of critique is the notion of Recapturing reality in opposition to its contemporary deformation requires a considerable amount of work. One has to reconstruct the fundamental categories of existence, experience, consciousness, and reality. One has at the same time to explore the technique and structure of the deformations that clutter up the daily routine; and one has to develop the concepts by which existential deformation and its symbolic expression can be categorized (Voegelin, 2006: 121) .
What results from this? The result from this is a twofold practical-political consequence; its second part is what provides us the normative direction of critique and political agency. First, any politics that attempts to, or actually does, violate the human condition, i.e., that claims answers to existential intangibilities/ineffabilities and implements respective political strategies that promise any kind of ultimate resolution, are to be resisted and rebelled against; 34 and second, humane politics, or politics that apperceives and is aware of the human condition, aims at allowing a diversity and plurality of expressions and symbolizations of the human condition, i.e., expressions and symbolizations of the search for answers to ultimate questions of political life without, however, providing answers to such questions. The thus concluding norm for directing critique and for political action is the creation of openness and of free spaces where such expressions and symbolizations can flourish.
We can call these spaces ideal-typically democratic or republican spaces, or just spaces of 16 humanity. We gain with Voegelin a language that does allow to regain (to 'recapture', as he says) normative thinking about humane politics without defining the contents of humanity. 35 He notes:
The core of political science is a noetic interpretation of man, society, and history that appears with the claim of critical knowledge of order vis-à-vis the order of that society in which, respectively, it emerges (Voegelin, 1990: 144) .
Triangulating the notions of contingency/perspectivity of knowledge, of dialectic negation, and of 'noesis' leads to four propositions for a normative framework for humane and democratic politics.
This will be discussed now.
Four concluding propositions
The social, political, and cultural embeddedness of the researcher
The notion of the time-space-contingency of knowledge and of the socio-political embeddedness of the researcher as discussed by Morgenthau is a fundamental notion of a hermeneutic understanding of social and political research. This notion implies the idea of situated knowledge. 36 It seems indispensable for meaningful critique to be aware of its own standpoint from, and embeddedness out of which, critique is being exerted. This seems to be for two reasons: the relation to, and perspective on, the 'object' criticized seems only to be adequate and suitable for critique when and if both the 'criticizer' and the 'critiqued' are understood in their individual contexts. For example, maybe self-evident, but still worthwhile to emphasize, an analysis and critique of a specific foreign policy that does not take into account domestic social and political rationales and conditions behind that policy is not as valid, meaningful, and powerful as a critique and analysis that does. But further to this, critique should also reflect upon the standpoint of the criticiser. Thus, from the notion of time-space-contingency of knowledge follows the social, political, and cultural situatedness of the researcher and the 'object-under-study' and therefore the perspectivity of critique as one of its conditions.
A research's self-criticality and self-refutability
The notion of dialectic negation leads, too, to a theoretical and practical proposition. This proposition holds that there is always another, a next viewpoint and thus no absolute certainty about, and finality of, one's own theoretical view and practice. Consequently, this proposition leads to the necessity of an inherent and permanent criticality towards own theories and practices. In its further consequence, it reasons an intrinsic awareness of the refutability of one's theoretical view and practice. This might be because of concrete historical alternatives to actual political and social developments or because of counter-arguments to theoretical suggestions; however, this proposition also includes the normative moment that the theoretician and the politician should always procure for and anticipate alternatives. This critical-theory demand resembles the practical consequences of the phenomenological notion of the 'project-in-draft'-character of every theory and action (according to Alfred Schütz) as well as the notions of 'différance' and erasure in Jacques Derrida:
the opposite is inherent in and authentic to everything, thus identity as linear and coherent beingwith-oneself is an illusion; every being is transformative and bears within it its own contradiction.
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Social sciences/humanities and the apperception of humanity
While both previous propositions of embeddedness/situatedness/perspectivity and of self-criticality/ self-refutability are as conditions of critique "only" meaningful in a deconstructive function, the notions of apperception and 'noesis' deliver normative standards for rearticulating and reconstructing political knowledge and order. Saying this, does not belittle the importance and relevance of the former, however, points to the necessity of a rearticulating and reconstructive moment in theory and practice. Critique needs direction to be meaningful. This seems to be a further condition of critique for two reasons: first, to direct the critique itself because critique is not an end in itself, but serves some purpose. In short, critique is less meaningful if it were only about undoing a theoretical or practical position without pointing a way out after deconstruction.
However, this requires explicit normativity; but how to frame and specify such normativity?
Second, the critiqued is left in a better position when he/she is being suggested theoretical and/or practical alternatives and visions. Thus, the question also seems to be about the normativity for this reconstruction, bearing in mind that this normativity, as argued above, needs to be qualified against the previous notions of self-criticality/self-refutability and contingency/perspectivity. Only then is the triangulation (as mentioned in the beginning of this paper) as the structure of the argument presented here about conditions of critique fulfilled. Voegelin's notion of 'noesis' seems to provide the explicit normativity required for the triangulation of conditions of critique. It provides the language that is needed to cast the direction of reconstruction and re-articulation -which are virtually one and the same process since, as Derrida and Lyotard emphasize, every deconstruction is in itself the re-articulation of a new narrative that is genuinely normative. 38 Therefore, the claim to deconstruct without normativity is nonsense.
The notion and language of 'noesis' tries to articulate humanity as the normative direction of critique. Without defining the content of humanity and humane politics -this would violate the two previous notions of self-criticality and self-refutability and contingency as well as the anthropology underlying the notion of 'noesis' itself -'noesis' does stress the indispensable and major status of human experience, including its contradictions, ambiguities, "intangibilities", and "ineffables"
before and paramount to all questions of institutional design, policy arrangements, and state sovereignty. This does not hold that these questions were unimportant, rather than that they need to follow and serve humane ends and experience. Put differently: political order in all its aspects needs to resonate with human experience -that is always historical, social, political, cultural, thus context-specific and situated -and ultimately serves society, not being an end in itself and developing a life independent of society, but for the purpose of ministering society. As was discussed and developed above, the resonance of political theory and political practice with humanity and human experience can and needs to be determined through deliberation that articulates and symbolizes its norms, desires, values etc. as well as through the creation and opening-up of fora for such deliberation and symbolization. Here, deliberation and symbolization do not follow any purpose apart from articulating itself, having been granted the function as yardstick for the resonance of political order that needs to be both open for and reflective upon such deliberation and apperceiving of human experience and its casting within contradictions, ambiguities, intangibilities, and ineffabilities. Non-apperception and non-resonance arises whenever deliberation and symbolization and their open fora for expression are shut down, hindered to articulate, and violated through epistemic or political ideologies, i.e., one-sided knowledge claims, unilateralism in international politics, military and direct violence etc. in the worst and most obvious cases; and prohibitions to ask questions, censorship, including self-censorship, stereotypes and prejudices, a-historical assumptions and their rationalizations, etc. etc., in short, all forms of cultural and structural violence 39 in more subtle cases.
The Non-Irreversibility of politics
In terms of politics, the triangulation of 'noesis', contingency/perspectivity, and self-criticality/selfrefutability results in the important policy framework of the non-irreversibility of policies. The idea that policies must not cause irreversible consequences is also implicit in the early discussions of environmental justice and generational accountability. The triangulation of conditions of critique results in a similar argument, however, theoretically differently (and I would argue more deeply)
founded. First publications emerged in German academic debates under the term "Umweltgerechtigkeit" in the 1980s in the context of the emergence of the Green Party, then as 'environmental justice' in US and subsequently in UK debates from the 2000s to present-day. A fundamental difference to the argument developed here is, however, that whereas most debates on environmental justice 40 assume accountability of environmental degradation to arise after it happened, thus in relation to the settling and elimination of consequences, the argument here holds that policies that lead to irreversible consequences are to be avoided in the first place. Contingency, refutability, and noetic apperception of theory and practices triangulate two conditions of human knowledge and practice (contingency; refutability) with a normative claim (apperception). This links the arguments presented here to the aspect of crises and crises prevention. There might be typical crises phenomena as the result of Western modernity, as argued by Marcuse, Morgenthau, and Voegelin; however, the analysis of crises and the awareness of their causes is one thing, to reflect upon and possess eventually a practically applicable framework for agency-withincrises and for possibly preventing crises is another. While the former seems epistemologically inevitable, but practically insufficient, the later seems politically necessary. The dictum of avoiding policy irreversibilities appears as such a framework. Saying this, several main questions arise for further research: How to define, specify, and assess irreversiblities? Also, at which scale and scope of consequences to speak of their irreversibility? These are questions for further elaboration.
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To end with, and critical of, but inspired by Morgenthau: it is not enough to subscribe to an ethics of evil due to the impossibility of pure ethical behaviour 42 , but to possess a theoretical and practical framework for self-reflective, self-constraining, and moderate politics that attempts to procure the avoidance of evil in the first place. The triangulation of the three principles of contingency, self-refutability, and noetic apperception as conditions of critique appears as such an attempt. Marcuse (2002 Marcuse ( [1964 ) and (1968) .
Notes
3 See Morgenthau (1944 Morgenthau ( ), (1960 Morgenthau ( ), (1959a Morgenthau ( ), (1955 Morgenthau ( ), (1945a Morgenthau ( ), (1945b Morgenthau ( ), (1962a Morgenthau ( ), (1962b , 
20
See here especially Horkheimer (1999 Horkheimer ( [1937 ).
21
See One-dimensional Man, Introduction. One could here, of course, go back into the wider context of Marxist and neo-Marxist theory, however, for the purpose of elaborating the principle of dialectic negation for the argument intended here, it shall suffice in this paper to reflect upon writings in the context of the Frankfurt School.
22
See, of course, their Dialectic of Enlightenment.
23
Again, this notion of dialectic could and would need to be elaborated in its historical dimensions pursuing this idea in Hegel and Marx and their receptions, but as before, it's here about this notion for the purpose of the argument of this paper and not about an historiography of respective ideas. , 1968: 67. 25 This points to inner contradictions in Marcuse's theory that -again -shall not be discussed here as this paper is about the notions of dialectic and negation as they are important for argument made here about the conditions of critique for which these notions are important irrespective of individual contradictions in specific authors.
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